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PARADIGM, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
1. INTRODUCTION*
The sub ject of m y con tribu tion  to the T a ljaardF estschrift 
is  focused on a ca rd in a l asp ec t of the con tem porary  d is ­
cu ssio n  in the  a rea  of theory  of science, nam ely  the re la ­
tio n sh ip  between science and so c ie ty ', and in  th is  connec­
tion  esp ec ia lly  the ro le  ascribed  by ce rta in  sch o la rs  to 
p a rad ig m s in  the p rac tice  of science. B ecause of its  
b ridge function, the f irs t ta sk  w ill be a  g lobal g e ttin g  ac ­
q uain ted  w ith  som e ch a ra c te ris tic  accen ts in  con tem po­
ra ry  theory  of science. If th is  is  successfu ll, it  can  hope­
fu lly  open up avenues for a v iew  of the  re la tio n sh ip  of the 
rem a in in g  two com ponents of the  above m entioned su b ­
ject.
2. SOME CONTEMPORARY ACCENTS IN THEORY 
OF SCIENCE
2.1. A s is w ell know n, R a tio n a lism  from  D escartes  to 
H egel h a s  placed the a prio ri s tru c tu re s  of know ledge in 
the forefront. A un ique  p arad ig m  of R a tio n a lis tic  fa ith  is 
for exam ple  K an t’s conviction  th a t he can  dem onstra te  
the p o ssib ility  of sy n th e tic  jud g em en ts  a priori. In the 
In troduction  of the C ritique o f P ure R eason  K ant fo rm u­
la te s  th is  as follows: “U pon such  syn the tic , th a t is, 
am p lia tiv e  p rin c ip les , a ll ou r a p r io r i sp ecu la tiv e  know ­
ledge m u st u ltim a te ly  rest; an a ly tic  ju d g m en ts  are  very  
im portan t, and indeed necessary , but only  for ob ta in in g  
th a t c lea rn ess  in the concep ts w hich  is  req u is ite  for such 
a  su re  and w ide sy n th es is  as  w ill lead to a genu ine ly  new 
addition  to all p rev io u s know ledge"2.
It seem s to speak  for itse lf and to pose no spec ia l p ro b ­
lem s. Yet, it con ta in s one of the m ost d ifficu lt n u c lear 
p rob lem s of m odern tim es, nam ely  the p rob lem  of p ro v i­
d ing  a ra tio n a l for p ro g re ss  in  h u m an  cu ltu re  and 
science, and spec ifica lly  the re la tio n sh ip  betw een the  
s tru c tu ra l g iven and the em p irica lly  d iscoverab le  new 
data. In  the  th e sis  quoted above, K ant sees n o th in g  le ss  
th a n  the m ain  ta sk  of ou r p u re  u n ders tand ing , w hich in 
the exerc ise  of its  c ritic a l function  can  lead to science, 
w hereby  tran scen d en ta l ph ilo so p h y  as the  idea of science 
is  th e  sy stem  of all p r in c ip le s  of the  pu re  u n d ers tan d ­
in g 3.
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Kant is  concerned about more than the analytical clarity  
of concept, as in the case of Descartes. He aim s for a cri 
tique  of the understanding which (1) d iscovers the neces­
sa ry  p resu p p o sitio n s  of knowledge, (2) throws tra n scen ­
dental light on the a priori possib ility  of the w ay of know ­
ing knowables, and (3) in a truly critica l manner d is­
covers the foundations for scientific points of departure 
(principles), and is  not m erely satisfied with a dogm atic 
usage4.
At least four aspects from the Kantian heritage are 
important for the understanding of priorities in contem ­
porary theory of science, nam ely (1) the relationship  
between idea and reality and the founding and demarca­
tion of science, respectively “m odel” science, (2) the crea­
tive view  of rationality, (3) the role of an a prio ri frame of 
reference and the problem of presuppositions, and (4) the 
critical possib ilities of a system . Individual accents 
which w ithin the general content of rationalistic faith 
receive various forms in the work of Hegel, Fichte and 
others, each have their own charm, but do not touch on the 
core of the actual paradigm and for the sake of lim itations 
of space they need not be discussed here5. However, it 
would be clarifying to mention a few developm ental 
m om ents of continuity and reaction.
2.2.1. A ccording to Karl Marx the tim e for a static inter­
pretation of reality is  passed. The task of philosophy is  to 
change reality dynam ically6. The problem is  not one of 
p ossessin g  and adding to our knowledge, but one of deter­
m ining how one can use one’s critical in sigh t into the pat­
terns of society to change the m achinery of the various  
socia l form s7.
The critica lly  constructive im plication of Kant’s  
R ationalistic system  are thus specified and concretized  
in term s of the factually given, ex isting , h istorically  
determined forms of society. This exp la ins the increas­
ing accent on negative dialectics w ithin esp ecia lly  tw en­
tieth century neo-M arxist tendencies, as for exam ple in 
the acute w ritings of T W Adorno8. The creative construc­
tive moment only p lays its role behind the screens of a 
mere chance of luck, as finally  acknowledged by H 
Marcuse. The dogm atically assured faith in progress 
which w as loaded with technocratic power, is thus sub­
jected to a critical devaluation.
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The ju s t  p resen ted  p h ilo soph ica l idea of p rac tica l change 
a lso  con ta in s the roo ts of the con tem porary  fash ions in  
ph ilosophy , such  as p raxeo log ica l ph ilosophy , w ith  
genetic  s itu a tio n a l c h a ra c te ris tic s  (the ch ang ing  of 
s tru c tu res), re le v an t science (engagé), and the dem ocra­
tiza tion  of s tru c tu re s  of society, especia lly  the u n iv e r­
sity . The m essag e  is  clear: in so fa r as K ant and p e rh ap s  
a ll of the ea rly  m odern tim es as such, are s till im p o rtan t 
for today, th is  m u st be re s tric ted  to the c ritica l K ant of the 
C ritique o f Practical Reason. But the c ritique , of course, 
is  especia lly  ap p ro p ria ted  then  for tw en tie th  cen tu ry  
p u rp o ses  and even for fu tu ro lo g ica l p u rposes, in  w hich 
case  the  R a tio n a lis tic  doctrine of p rin c ip les  no longer 
re a lly  needs to be treated.
In  th e  second place, the  fo llow ing  re la tio n sh ip s  in  the 
T heory  of science becom e in c re as in g ly  problem atic: the 
re la tio n sh ip  betw een the  log ica l a  prio ri and em pirica l 
fac tua lity , betw een fo rm al and s itu a tio n a lly  determ ined 
sy stem s (includ ing  n a tu ra l language), betw een p h y sics  
a s  th e  m odel n a tu ra l science and socio logy as  the  m odel 
h u m an  science, betw een exac tly  determ inab le  descrip ­
tiv e  and s ta tis tic a lly  ap p ro x im atin g  p ro b ab ility  theo ­
ries.
In  sev e ra l re sp ec ts  th is  im plied  a change of accent from  
science as a re su lt w ith  its  p resu p p o sitio n s, to the h is ­
to rica l, an th ropo log ica l, m ethodolog ical and social 
asp ec ts  of science.
2.2.2 A second im p o rtan t change of focus concerns the  
s tru g g le s  of esp ec ia lly  W D ilthey, not to succum b to  the 
em p tin ess  of h is to rica l re la tiv ism . In v a rio u s  w ays, 
v a rio u s  tw en tie th  cen tu ry  sch o la rs  such  as J  Dewey, M 
Foucault, J  H aberm as and J H v an  den B erg show  us the 
consequences of h is  in n o v a tiv e  a n a ly s is9. In  th is  respect 
w e find th a t today  v iew s about the  h is to ric ity  of (even 
scien tific ) ideas find broad  acceptance, in te rn a lly  con­
nected to s im ila r  ideas about the ch an g in g  ch a ra c te r  of 
hum an  natu re . F rom  the basic  and fundam ental changes 
in  n a tu re  and society, one can accord ing ly  fathom  the 
basic  ch a ra c te ris tic s  and p o ssib ilitie s  of science. F as­
c in a tin g  ex am ples  of th is  have been g iven  by v a rio u s  
sch o la rs  such  as  M Foucault, L K olakow ski, H G 
G adam er and  P  R ico eu r10.
Science th u s  does not on ly  show  ch a ra c te ris tic  s ig n s  of 
its  tim es, is no t m erely  tim e rela ted , but is  in  its  own in n e r 
n a tu re  a tem p o ra l phenom enon, w hich  can  on ly  be under­
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stood from  the  h is to rica l determ ination  of the  social con­
tex t w ith in  w hich it p lays  its  role. An adap ta tion  of the 
tem pora l ch a rac te r of science is  thus connected to the im ­
portance of science as the academ ic c u ltu ra l labour of a 
com m unity  of th inkers, w hich has specific consequences 
for the society  w ith in  w hich th is  com m unity  functions, It 
is understandab le  th a t in connection w ith  the scien tific  
dom ination  of hum an  society and w ith  the s itua tio n isti-  
ca lly  hollow ed out concept of reason , p robab ility  theory  
becom es a touchy touch stone for the sc ien tific  en te r­
prise.
2.2.3 In the th ird  place, it  is  rem arkab le  th a t H usserl — 
even though  in h is con tribu tion  to L ogos  of 1910 he s till 
defended ph ilosophy  as rig o u ro u s science (be it the m ost 
p rob lem atic  scien tific  d iscip line) — finds the key to 
ph ilosophy  in c ritica l reflection  and m ethodological 
re se a rc h 11. In line w ith th is  the essence of tw entieth  cen­
tu ry  science is  in c reasin g ly  focused on the dynam ics of 
research . T his w as underscored  a t an  ea rly  stage already, 
and in  a m ore m arked  w ay than  in  H u sse rl’s case, by M 
H eidegger, w ho illu s tra te s  th is  p rocess by h is  m ethod of 
trac in g  a netw ork  of track s  in the w oods12. The n a tu re  of 
science, a lready  concentrated  in  m ethodology in  a fargo- 
ing  w ay, th u s  s till finds a supportive  re la tio n sh ip  to the 
herm eneu tic  parad igm , flanked here and there  by d ia lec­
tica l decorations. But the w ritin g  w as a lready  on the w all, 
and the developm ent of operational techn iques as the 
m ethodical nucleus of a wide range of sciences, m akes 
the m essage unm istak ab ly  clear. It should  not su rp rise  
us th a t a m eta-m odel could develop so fa s t and in such  a 
sh o rt tim e. Thus, in line w ith  the accent on c ritica l reflec­
tion about the m ethodology of scien tific  research , th e re  is  
s till the p o ssib ility  of a la s t s tronghold  ag a in s t a rad ica l 
techn ifica tion  of science. And so long  as the re  is  s till the 
tran scen d in g  d is tan tia tio n  of m etascience, of m etatheory  
and of m e ta language  w ith respect to its  subject m atter, 
the door is  s till s lig h tly  open for a h ig h e r trum pcard : a 
sy n th es is  of the tw entieth  cen tu ry  duo of, on the one side 
theory  of science and on the o ther side the em p irica l s ta te  
of affa irs  in  science as it is  ac tua lly  g iven  to d ay 13.
G lobaly speak ing , the tem p o rarily  lim ited  ch a ra c te r  of 
science and its  m ethodological p rob lem atics  are  accen­
tuated , c losely  re la ted  to a s tro n g er in te res t in  theory  of 
science o r ph ilosophy  of science, and ph ilo so p h ica l
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logic. Important contributions to th is have been made by 
a o Black, Braithwaite, Harré, Popper and Price14.
2.2.4 In the fourth place, esp ecia lly  anthropological 
factors of science com e to the fore in the twentieth cen­
tury, first in Europe, esp ecia lly  in Germany and France, 
particularly through the contributions of the Philosophy  
of Life, of E xistentialism , and also  of E xisten tia listica lly  
oriented phenom enology. But in the last decade specifi­
ca lly  also in North A m erica15 (especia lly  now that the 
analytic traditions are increasingly  being accounted for 
in Europe16), probably as com pensation for its  own 
strongly analytical and related tendencies in the past, 
and perhaps also  by w ay of g iv in g  in to a slow ly  increa­
sin g  d issatisfaction  with log ical positiv ism , which  
alw ays w as and still is  strong there. In this w ay not only a 
new idea of man entered into science, but the road w as 
also  opened for a new view  of and application of thinking, 
m eaning and rationality, with consequences especia lly  
for the formation of scientific theory and term inology.
2.3.1 The m odel for science now roughly looks as 
follows: Science is  essen tia lly  a com m unal research pro­
cess  w ithin a sp ecifica lly  determined social-h istorical 
science tradition, with as its central problem the founda­
tion of publically  sanctioned17 log ica l m eaning and as its  
m ain task  the developm ent of techniques that are m etho­
dical-operational rules w ith practical relevance and 
im plications.
2.3.2 Thus, there ex ists  a close inner relationship  
between science and society. The socia l relatedness of the 
scien tist as researcher, the role and channels of com m u­
nication of information, the manner and effect of m aking  
givens, d iscoveries and insight public, and m any other 
facets of these relationships have been researched in an 
intriguing manner in what is  called the socio logy of 
science by people such as M Scheler, K Mannheim and 
others. We find th is uniquely represented especia lly  in 
the work of K R Merton and J Ben-David, who also  deve­
loped new  socio log ica l techn iques18. The important role 
played by the research project in this respect has been 
uniquely demonstrated by I Lakatos19.
Within the above framework w e find brilliant critiques of 
scien tistic  onesidedness by, e g, Apel, Habermas,
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Schulz20 and others, as w ell as helpfull analyses of cer­
tain epistem ological facets of science and society by, 
among others, Hanson (foundations and sign ificance of 
scientific d iscovery)21, Foucault (the social-intellectual 
backgrounds of the scien tist’s attitude)22 and Polanyi 
(whose original an alysis of the so called tacit dim ension  
especia lly  drew a lot of attention)23.
Through contributions like that, m any facets of the scien­
tific enterprise are re-arranged and re-connected in  new  
and clarifying w ays. Kuhn’s contribution — through h is  
concept of the paradigm — to a deeper understanding of 
crucial m atters in the theory of science d iscussions and 
research, vindicates h is approach as sufficiently im por­
tant to take a closer look and to critically  analyse its  main  
lin es24.
3. THE SCIENCE IDEA OF T S KUHN
3.1. Before com ing to a sketch of the main d im ensions of 
his theory of science, we first have to pay attention to 
som e facets of the developm ent of Kuhn’s v iew s, m aking  
use of a sim plified model to approxim ate the intentions of 
his concept of science25.
With the publication of h is The Structure of Scien tific  
R evo lu tion s26 Kuhn received acknowledgem ent in m any  
quarters and started an important d iscussion  in the area 
of the theory and history of science. This publication  
already m eans a definite stage in the developm ent of h is  
academic training and interest, as w ell as in the develop­
ment of h is scientific view s. Later studies show  further 
growth and at least changes of accent.
Personal experience, of course, is  not a lw ays determini- 
tive as far as the nature and quality of a scientific d isci­
pline are concerned. However, in the case of Kuhn 
various dim ensions of h is own developm ent became 
m otives w ith rich consequences for h is later work. Thus, 
an understanding and evaluation of h is theory of science  
as such can not easily  be achieved w ithout bringing these  
m om ents of developm ent to the fore. I lim it m yself to four 
of these m otives in h is thinking25.
At the end of h is doctoral studies in p h ysics Kuhn had a 
pedagogically  stim ulating shock experience: the teach­
ing of the natural sciences and the literature of which it
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m ade use  appeared  to be out of touch  w ith  the ac tu a l s ta te  
of a ffa irs  in th e  sc iences them selves. T his m o tiva tes  
K uhn to engage  in  a  s tudy  of the n a tu re  and esp ec ia lly  the 
h is to ry  of h is  d isc ip line , f in a lly  slow ly  b roaden ing  out to 
a s tu d y  of the  h is to ry  of the n a tu ra l sciences. T h is g ives 
r is e  to an  in te re s t in  the  p h ilo so p h ica l p rob lem s of the 
n a tu ra l sciences, and in  a w ay even in  the ph ilo so p h y  of 
sc ience as su ch 27. T his developm enta l background  is  im ­
p o rtan t, because up  to h is  la te s t p u b lica tions, K uhn 
show s a fundam en ta l in te re s t in  the pedagogica l d im en ­
sion  of sc ien tific  p rac tice , e sp ec ia lly  the tra in in g  of s tu ­
den ts  to becom e resp o n sib le  sch o lars . F or d u rin g  th is  
tim e s tan d ard  exam ples of sc ien tific  in s ig h t and activ ity , 
s tan d a rd  ex p erim en ts  and s tan d ard  lite ra tu re  (texts and 
tex tbooks) have a fund am en ta lly  m ou ld ing  effect on the 
sc ie n tis t in  tra in in g , in  o rder to m ake h im  feel a t hom e in 
the com m only  accepted h y p o th eses  and the v a rio u s  
v iew s th a t a re  held  in  the re le v an t d isc ip lines.
T h is pedagog ical d im ension  a lso  s tim u la te s  h istorica l 
in te re s t in  K uhn. By m ean s of re sea rch  in  the h is to ry  of 
h is  d isc ip line , of the  n a tu ra l sciences, and even of science 
as  such , he tr ie s  to ga in  in s ig h t in to  the a ssu m p tio n s  and 
p references of sc ien tific  m em bers of a sp ec ia lty  group, 
do ing  a spec ia l p iece of research . In h is to ry  K uhn also  
finds the ex am p les  w hich  he u ses  to dem o n stra te  the 
c h a ra c te r  and  sa lie n t a sp ec ts  of co n tem p o rary  science in 
selected  facets, to s ta r t  d ea lin g  w ith  the questio n  of sc ien ­
tific  p ro g re ss  and to c ritic a lly  te s t sc ien tific  trad itio n s, 
ev en tu a lly  rep la c in g  them  w ith  h is  own approach . 
H is to ric a l re sea rch  th u s  becom es a p a r t  of K uhn’s m etho­
dology of science and  th is  ex p la in s  w hy he is  m ore in te r ­
ested  in  the  dynam ic p ro cess  of the  g row th  of science than  
in  its  p roducts. It a lso  ex p la in s  the  b as is  on w hich  K uhn, 
in  se lec tin g  and a p p ly in g  h is to rica l exam ples, could 
show  h is  ow n v ery  in te re s tin g  view  of the p rob lem s and 
p o ss ib ilitie s  in h e re n t in a h is to ry  of ideas, spec ifica lly  of 
the rise , fo rm u la tion  and  effect of sc ien tific  ideas 
th ro u g h o u t the  c e n tu rie s28. T h is a lso  rev ea ls  the roo ts  of 
h is  theo ry  about sc ien tific  revo lu tions; and a b it of the 
reaso n  for th e  ob jections of re la tiv ism  w hich  h as  been ex ­
p ressed  by the  c r it iq u e s29.
A second illu m in a tin g  experience  w as the p e rso n a l con ­
ta c t w hich K uhn acqu ired  w ith  the w ay of w ork in g  and 
the developm ent of th in k in g  w ith in  the h u m an ities . T his 
esp ec ia lly  concerned  p rob lem s about c r ite r ia  for tru e  
science, w h ich  no t only  b ro u g h t new p h ilo so p h ica l basic
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prob lem s of the theo ry  of science w ith in  h is  reach , bu t 
a lso  gave h im  an in c re as in g  and up to now perm an en t 
in te re s t in  the  socia l fac to rs  of science and in  connection  
w ith  them  the soc ia l-psycho log ica l factors. Im p o rtan t in 
th is  resp ect a re  the  socia l c o m m itm en ts  of th e  p ro ­
fessional sc ien tis t to the  group  to w hich  he belongs, and 
the va lues  w hich  are  realized  in  th is  g roup  and w hich  
com e to lig h t am ong  o ther th in g s  in  w h a tev e r such  a 
group  is p rep ared  to g ive up and w hatever it feels called  
to m ain ta in . E sp ec ia lly  p sycho log ica l re sea rch  can  
th row  lig h t on these  va lues, accord ing  to Kuhn.
The specia l com bination  of a  fourth  d im ension  w ith  the 
socia l-psycho log ical, h is to rica l, and pedagog ica l facto rs  
in  K uhn’s though t, lends h is  idea of science a co lour and 
charm  of its  own and also  allow s u s  to  decisively  d is tin ­
g u ish  h im  from  o ther em inen t h is to ria n s  of science, e sp e­
cia lly  in  Europe; no t m ere ly  from  e a r lie r  ones such  as 
D uhem , w ith  w hom  he show s in ten tio n a l re la tio n sh ip s  
here and the re  beneath  the surface, bu t a lso  from  con tem ­
p o ra ry  ones such  as E J D ijk ste rhu is , R H ooykaas, L W H 
H ull, H F K earney  and M Foucault.
T his fourth  basic  po in t of in te re s t in  K uhn’s theo ry  of 
science is  the cogn itive  process. J u s t as in  the case of E in ­
stein , B ohr and sev era l o ther c rea tiv e  sp ir its  of tw en tie th  
cen tu ry  science, K uhn also  is in trigued  by ep istem o log i-  
cal p rob lem s and perspectives. But in  h is  case  we do find 
a d is tin c t focusing  on two facets: (1) the re la tio n sh ip  to 
theory  fo rm ation  and (2) p rob lem s of fo rm aliza tion , 
lin g u a l fo rm ulation  and com m unica tion . The 
ep istem o log ica l fac to r s tim u la ted  K uhn in  h is  la te s t 
p u b lica tio n s  to  ou tline  a theo ry  of know ledge of h is  own, 
in  w hich  he p ay s  p a r tic u la r  a tten tio n  to th e  con tribu tion  
of percep tion  stim uli, in s tead  of to the  p o p u la r  doctrine  of 
sense-data , w hich  today  is  in c re a s in g ly  being  c r it i­
cized30.
My a n a ly s is  of K uhn’s s ta tem en ts  in  h is  v a r io u s  w ri­
tin g s  confirm s the  im p ressio n  th a t on ly  th e  in te rre la te d ­
n ess  of the  above m entioned  four m o tives in  h is  th eo ry  of 
science rev ea ls  the  golden th read  of h is  v iew  of th e  con­
s titu tiv e  dem ensions of science, a s  w ell as  h is  in ten tio n  
in  m o tiv a tin g  and defending ce rta in  p r io r itie s  in  sc ien ­
tific  d iscu ss io n s  and debates. Those w ho n eg lec t o r  m is ­
in te rp re t the  m u tu a l re la tio n sh ip s  of th ese  fou r factors, 
m ore th a n  once e ith e r m isu n d e rstan d  K uhn him self,
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leading to caricatures and onesided critical evaluations, 
or land in an opportunistic favouring of one of these  
them es according to one’s own preference without doing 
justice to the totality  of Kuhn’s v iew s31.
3.2. Now I com e to a d iscussion  of som e central 
m om ents of Kuhn’s theory of science. In order to try to 
relate Kuhn’s intentions in a just manner, I w ill follow  
him  as c lo se ly  as possib le in h is various relevant state­
ments.
3.2.1 Kuhn’s research is  prim arily focused on the dyna­
m ic process through w hich scientific  knowledge is  ac­
quired and not so much on the log ica l structure of the pro­
ducts of scientific research. In this respect Kuhn is closer  
to the Pragm atism  of Dewey than to the Logical P osi­
tiv ism  of Carnap32. A ccording to Kuhn science com es into 
existence through the activ ities of professional groups 
that are active in a specific scien tific  area or in a part of it. 
A basic problem of Kuhn is that of the values that hold in 
such a professional group, out of which we can begin to 
understand the course and the progress of science. He 
him self com pactly states this as follows: “Whatever 
scientific  progress m ay be, we m ust account for it by 
exam ining the nature of the scientific  group, d iscovering  
what it values, what it tolerates and what it d isdains”33. 
This kind of inquiry is  the responsib ility  of the socio lo ­
gist. More specifica lly , it is  the responsib ility  of a social 
psychology w hich has to determine, not the individual 
differences in personality between scientists, but the 
behaviour, activ ities, certainties, assum ptions, etc. of 
scien tists as a group. The basic question they have to 
answer is  as follows: “How w ill a particular constellation  
of beliefs, va lu es and im peratives affect group beha­
viour?”34.
In order to understand why scien tists prefer a certain  
choice or com e to a certain conclusion, it is  important to 
get to know the underlying factors which in a case like  
this direct the scientist and are codeterm inative for h is  
decision. In m y opinion, Kuhn w as right to direct our 
attention to a fact like the variability  of evaluation  in this  
case, in w hich we find differences in application of 
values. He also  rightly directed our attention to the fact 
that choice w ith respect to a theory can not be made 
m ere ly  on the basis of log ica l grounds. Of course, this
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does not im ply  th a t such  a p rocess is  therefore s im p ly  
irra tio n a l. T hat k ind  of p rim itiv e  Irra tio n a lism  is  not 
K uhn’s view. But it is true  th a t h is  an a ly s is  of the b as is  on 
w hich the choices are m ade, is  not everyw here  eq u a lly  
in c is iv e35.
In any  case  it is  c lea r th a t the tra in in g  and fo rm ing  of 
sc ien tis ts  to becom e sp ec ia lis ts  re la ted  to a specific 
group, w ill have an  im p o rtan t effect on th e ir  com m on 
assu m p tio n s  and decisions. T his p a r tic u la r  p o in t of con­
cen tra tion , as it ap p ea rs  to me, sends K uhn in  a d ifferent 
d irec tion  from , for exam ple, R adnitzky , w ho looks for the 
key to the theory  of science in  the d irec tion  of an  a n th ro ­
po log ically  founded eth ics of sc ience36. This s ta te  of 
affa irs  safeguards K uhn’s in ten tions from  m ob p sy ch o ­
logy37. H owever, since the scien tific  g roup  becom es the 
final court of appeal in  K uhn’s view , and since th is  g roup  
h as  the final decision about w hat w ill be ch arac te rised  as 
scien tific , we do have to face the question  w hether we are  
not confronted here by the socia l ru le  of an  elite. If the  
objection  of sub jec tiv ism  is too s tro n g  for K uhn, we s till 
need to a sk  w hether certa in  tendencies of socia l subjec- 
tiv iza tio n  do not begin  to co lour h is  sc ience38.
We p robab ly  find the key  in K uhn’s view  of tw o c en tra l 
concepts, nam ely  those of “co n ste lla tio n ” (of a ll k in d s  of 
facto rs, such  as  beliefs, values, and techn iques) and  of 
“va lu e  sy stem ”. The in n e r re la tio n sh ip  of th ese  e luc i­
dates K uhn’s idea of parad igm . Before we can  ev a lu a te  
th is, we f irs t have to say  a b it m ore about K uhn’s v iew  of 
science in  developm ent.
3.2.2 In d esign ing  h is  theory  of science from  the deve­
lop ing  n a tu re  of science, K uhn jo in s  the h is to r io g ra p h i­
cal revo lu tion  in the study  of science, w hich  posed new 
k inds of q uestions  and developed new k inds of re sea rch  
and w hich does not m erely  follow cu m ula tive  develop­
m ent lin es  for science. In th is  w ay, accord ing  to K uhn, a 
new  view  of science develops39. H is an a ly s is  of th is  
show s the fo llow ing d irec tiv e s40:
Science is  a dynam ic, evo lu tio n ary  process, bu t not 
s im p ly  because of p ro g ress iv e  add itions of ind iv idual 
d iscoveries, as  h as  been th o u g h t for cen tu ries .
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Science is  developed w ith  the  help  of an tiq u a ted  theories. 
The la tte r  a re  not in  p rin c ip le  unscien tific , bu t s im ply  
incom patib le  w ith  theo ries  th a t are  now  en terta ined . So, 
even an tiquated  theo ries rem a in  im p o rtan t for the p re ­
sen t s ta te  of affa irs  in  science, and esp ec ia lly  are  they 
n ecessa ry  for h is to ric a l research . In the second place, not 
o n ly  is  the ch rono log ica l d ifference betw een le ss  and 
m ore  developed theo ries im p o rtan t, bu t a lso  the ir re ­
v ers ib le  un id irec tio n a l p ro g re ss  of science, because of 
w h ich  con tem porary  th eo ries  w ere not po ssib le  a th o u ­
sand  y e a rs  ago and th eo ries  of long  ago do not fit in the 
co n tem porary  s itua tion . Im p o rtan t as w ell is  K uhn’s in ­
s ig h t into the m u tu a lly  com parab le  bu t unb ridgeab le  
d ifferences betw een theories, so m eth in g  like  a typo logy  
of sc ien tific  theories.
M ethodical d irec tives  a re  in su ffic ien t to d ic ta te  a un ique  
and con ten t-rich  conclusion  fo r m any  k in d s of sc ien tific  
q uestio n s. F rom  th is  it ap p e a rs  th a f  K uhn does not su b ­
scribe  to the la te  R a tio n a lis tic  fa ith  in  m ethod as the m ost 
im p o rtan t facto r in science. O ther and d ifferent factors, 
acco rd ing  to him , also  p la y  a ro le  in  the p rac tice  of 
science. A n exam ple  w ould  be th a t the re  is  no n eu tra l 
a lg o rith m  for theo ry  choice.
The d is tin g u ish in g  fac to r of v a rio u s  schoo ls  is  not 
m ethod ica l failu re , because  every  school is  scientific . 
R ather, the d is tin g u ish in g  fac to r is  the fact th a t each 
school in  its  view  of the w orld  and  in  its  p rac tice  of 
science holds a view  w hich  is  incom parab le . In  ce rta in  
re sp ec ts  th is  b rin g s  about p a r tia l  com m unica tion . Som e­
tim es  a “G esta lt” sw itch  is  needed to no tice the m erits  of 
an o th e r view. N eu tra lity  in  science is  un tenab le , both in 
the  sense  of irre lev an ce  (the ro le  of the v iew er who objec­
tiv e ly  reg is te rs  facts from  a d istance), and  in  the sense  of 
the va lue  free im m un iza tion  a g a in s t th eo ries  co n ta in in g  
in te rp re ta tio n s  and w orld  v iew s. T here is  no p u re  
la n g u ag e  of observation . N eu tra l and  objective rep o rts  
abou t g ivens are  therefo re  im possib le .
T rad itio n  p la y s  an im p o rtan t and e ssen tia l ro le  in the 
developm ent of science. H ow ever, dec isive  for the u n d er­
s ta n d in g  of the developm ent of science is  no t the co n ti­
n u ity  of the trad itio n  as th a t is  exp ressed  in the co n ti­
n u ity  of no rm al science, bu t the  re v o lu tio n a ry  p rocess 
w hereby  an old theo ry  is  re jected  and  rep laced  by a new 
one w hich  is irreco n c ilab le  w ith  it. T h is im p lie s  a break, a 
leap  and  a reo rien ta tio n . A lso  in th is  re sp ec t K uhn is
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tru ly  a son of the tw en tie th  cen tury , a c ritic a l opponent of 
n ine teen th  cen tu ry  la te  R a tio n a lis tic  ideas of con tinu ity  
of grow th, of sc ien tific  developm ent on the p a tte rn  of the 
g rad u a l ap p ea ran ce  of the con tours  of a m ap of the w orld  
as our know ledge of facts increases.
3.2.3 One po in t a t w hich K uhn’s v iew s of ‘science in  
developm ent’ ap p ea rs  to be esp ec ia lly  im portan t, is  in  
h is  view  about o rd in ary  and ex tra o rd in a ry  science. It 
ap p ea rs  to m e th a t the fo llow ing are  the  m ost im p o rtan t 
d im en sio n s40:
S cien tis ts  are  tra ined  for an  art, for experienced  and 
com petent w ork in o rd inary , norm al, p rev a len t science; 
th a t is, re sea rch  on the tru sted  b as is  of ce rta in  sc ien tific  
ach ievem en ts  w hich a re  acknow ledged by a specific  
sc ien tific  com m unity  as basis  for scien tific  practice . In 
th is  re sp ec t s tan d ard  tex tbooks (popu lar since  the n in e ­
teen th  cen tu ry ) or a lso  c la ss ica l w orks of g rea t sc ien tis ts  
can p lay  a spec ia l role.
‘N orm al sc ience’ o r ‘no rm al re sea rch ’ is  p rac tised  w ith in  
a developed, realised , tru ly  scien tific  d isc ip line , th a t is  
one in the case  of w hich the change-over from  a p ro to ­
science to a true  science h as  been achieved, and w here 
there  is no lo n g e r a concen tra tion  on w eak areas, on th e ir  
e lim in a tio n  w ith  the help  of a lte rn a tiv e  theories.
When resea rch  in a ce rta in  a rea  h as  m atured , the d isc i­
p line  in  question  h a s  theories  and techn iques  w hich 
an sw er to the fo llow ing  requ irem en ts:
(1) On the b as is  of a field dem arcation  c rite rio n  we can 
say  th a t a specific a rea  of re search  is  a  po ten tia l 
science'^only if for a specific group  of n a tu ra l pheno­
m ena we find concrete p red ic tions from  the p ractice  
w ith in  th is  specific  field.
(2) P red ic tion  successes concern ing  any  sub  c lass  of 
phenom ena have to be achieved co n sis ten tly  (com ­
pare  the difference betw een P to lem aic astronom y  
and astro logy).
(3) P red ic tion  techn iques m u st be rooted in a  theory  
w hich  se rv es  as th e ir  foundation, w hich ex p la in s  
th e ir  lim ited  success and w hich  su g g es ts  m an n ers  
in  w hich  im provem ents in  p rec isio n  and reach  can  
be achieved.
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(4) Im provem en t in  p red ic tion  tech n iq u es  h a s  to be a 
ta sk  w ith  a challenge, w hich  req u ire s  a  h ig h  m ea­
su re  of ta len t and dedication.
In  such  a  ph ase  sc ien tis ts  no longer need to copy w hat 
cam e before. They can  now dedicate  th e ir  energy  to the 
basic  ta sk  of no rm al science, i.e., the so lv in g  of puzzles as 
a  cha llen g e  to th e ir  ingenu ity ; and  w ith  re sp ec t to them :
(1) T ry  to expand the a re a  of re lev an ce  and p rec isio n  of 
ex is tin g  ex p erim en ts  and theories.
(2) Im prove the congruence betw een them .
(3) T ry  to get rid  of conflic ts  betw een the v a rio u s  theo ­
rie s  in use.
(4) E lim inate  co llis io n s  w hen a s in g le  theo ry  is  used in 
differen t app lica tio n s .
S c ien tis ts  w ork ing  in  a m a tu re  sc ien tific  d isc ip lin e  are  
con tro lled  by a s tro n g  netw ork  of g ro u p  com m itm en ts of 
a concep tual-theoretica l, in s tru m e n ta l and m ethodolo­
g ica l na tu re . In short, they  a re  con tro lled  by the cen tra l 
ro le  of a com m unal p arad igm .
W ith the help of such  a  p a rad ig m  the sc ien tis t forces 
n a tu re  in to  the preform ed  and re la tiv e ly  unp liab le  box 
w hich  the p a rad ig m  is. N orm al science is  no t a fte r new 
phenom ena, i.e. the d iscovery  of new  phenom ena: often 
those  th a t do not fit in to  the box, a re  not even noticed. And, 
secondly , it is  no t a fte r concep tual n o v e lties  either: o rd i­
n a r ily  sc ien tis ts  don’t go fo r d es ig n in g  new  theories, and 
a t tim es they  are  even  in to le ran t tow ard  th eo ries  
designed  by o thers.
O rd in a ry  science does req u ire  the  so lu tion  of a ll k in d s  of 
com plex  in s tru m en ta l, concep tua l and  m a th em a tica l 
puzzles, w hich are  a  spec ia l ca teg o ry  of p rob lem s 
dem and ing  ingenu ity  and  ab ility  in  th e ir  so lu tion . It a lso  
re q u ire s  so lu tions  w hich  a re  (1) lim ited  in  n a tu re  by ru le s  
and  (2) d e term ina tive  for the  s tep s  of the so lu tion . I th in k  
th a t h ere  we have  an  im p o rtan t bu t no t com plete ly  c lea r 
d im ension  of K u h n ’s v iew s. A bout w h at k ind  of ru le s  is  
he ta lk in g  here?  A ccord ing  to K uhn he m eans an  e s ta ­
b lished  p o in t of view , o r fo rm ulated  d ifferen tly , a p reco n ­
ception . T his is  a  com m itm en t com ing  to ex p ress io n  in 
law s and theories. H ow  th is  happens, is  no t concre te ly  
exp la ined  by K uhn in  deta il, as fa r as  I can  see.
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An im p o rtan t po in t in  connection w ith  o rd in ary  sc ien ­
tific ac tiv ity  is, fu rther, th a t the p rob lem s of parad igm  
a rticu la tio n  are  both theo re tica l and experim en ta l (there­
fore also  practica l). With th is  K uhn d estroys yet ano ther 
one of the sanctified  g la ssh o u ses  of P ositiv ism . T heory 
and experim en t are  m u tu a lly  so re la ted  th a t one of them  
cannot be handled  w ithou t the o ther, according  to Kuhn.
In sum m ary , the lite ra tu re  of no rm al science co n s is ts  of 
th ree g ro u p s of problem s:
(1) The determ ination  of s ig n ifican t facts.
(2) The re la tin g  of theo ries  and facts to one another.
(3) A rticu la tio n  and p recision  of a theory.
W ithin the free p lay  ran g e  of o rd in ary  science, the sc ien ­
tis t is som etim es confronted w ith  the p roblem  th a t som e­
th in g  is  no t qu ite  righ t, th a t som eth ing  is  w rong  in  the 
sense th a t it dev ia tes from  the assum ed  p rac tices  and 
g roup  com m itm ents. When th is  develops in to  a c r is is  (the 
a rb itra ry  elem ent in  the p a rad ig m  assu re s  th a t new th eo ­
rie s  canno t be sup p ressed  too long), the re  is  occasion  for 
a sc ien tific  revo lu tion , w hich th ro u g h  a change and ad ap ­
ta tion  to the accepted p a rad ig m  n o rm alizes the d istu rbed  
s itu a tio n  and so the anom aly  becom es the expected and 
accepted th ing . This p rocess beg ins w ith  the lo ss  of re le ­
vance of the p arad igm  and the looser app lica tio n  of the 
ru les  of o rd in ary  research . T his req u ire s  the d iscovery  of 
new facts a n d /o r  the design  of a new theory . T his m eans 
th a t the sc ien tis t m u st le a rn  to see n a tu re  in a new  w ay, 
w hich is  m ore than  an add itional ad ap ta tio n  of a theory. 
In rea lity  th is  m eans a change in  parad igm . A scien tific  
revo lu tion  is  a t bottom  a consequen tia l change in w orld 
view.
From  the above it is c lea r th a t the re la tio n  of o rd in a ry  and 
ex tra o rd in a ry  science becom es c ritic a l in  the ro le  of the 
parad igm . We w ill have to b riefly  try  to follow the course  
of K uhn’s th o u g h ts  reg a rd in g  th is  cen tra l concept in  h is  
idea of science.
3.3. The p a rad ig m  puzzle in  the v iew s of K uhn
3.3.1 E ven  though  the concep t of the p arad ig m  is  not 
new  in  ph ilosophy , since for exam ple  a fte r P lato  W ittgen­
s te in  h as  accounted for it in  our cen tury , K uhn’s h an d lin g  
of the concept of the p arad igm  is no t in  the le a s t tra d i­
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tional and also very complicated, including a number of 
changes in accentuation as tim e goes on. Let us start with 
a sim plified sketch of the m ost important aspects of 
Kuhn’s view  of the paradigm 41.
Exem plary scientific achievem ents which are so unique, 
that they are able to attract an established group of scho­
lars that have been practising com petitive w ays of sc ien ­
tific practice, but that as achievem ents are still suffi­
ciently pliable to leave all sorts of problems open for 
solution by that group of scientists, can according to 
Kuhn be characterised as a paradigm.
Such a paradigm can be isolated in a generally acknow­
ledged scientific achievem ent which for some time offers 
model problems and solutions to a group of scien tists and 
w hich especia lly  com es to expression in selected exam ­
p les that are typical for knowledge and insight in a sp e­
cific  area. On the other hand, it does jnake the scientist 
blind for phenomena which do not fit in this particular 
box, and in this w ay it does suppress on a certain level 
and for a certain time the possib ility  of seeing and d is­
covering new things.
Thanks to the just described role of the paradigm there 
develops a coherent research tradition, which Kuhn calls  
normal science. The presence of a paradigm is therefore a 
sign  of full maturity in the developm ent of a certain  
scientific area.
A paradigm prepares the student for participation in a 
specia l scientific com m unity and it moulds him in this 
fashion. Such a paradigm also ties scientific research to 
common rules and standards for scientific practice. Para­
digm  as a professional, perhaps even m ethaphysical or 
pseudo-m ethaphysical commitment, precedes and is  
more com prehensive than the concepts, laws, theories 
and points of view  which are abstracted from it. Conse­
quently, differing in sigh ts in form ulating and view ing  
the paradigm itself m ay em erge occasionally.
This im plies an im plicit possession  of m utually related 
theories and m ethodological assum ptions, which make 
selection, evaluation and criticism  possible. As such this 
som etim es creates the im pression of a basic pattern (in 
the sense of) on which the scientist m odels h is theories or 
other work. To put it differently, it directs research with  
the help of (1) m odels and (2) abstract rules.
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The parad ig m  has  a cognitive and a no rm ative  function, 
i.e., it a lso  h as  a reg u la tiv e  function w ith  resp ect to the 
‘n o rm a l’ p rac tice  of science.
B ecause of its  foundational charac ter, a parad ig m  alw ays 
p la y s  a c irc u la r  ro le  in a debate, th a t is, it ju s tif ie s  itself. 
A parad ig m  cannot be corrected  th rough  science and is  
not capab le of testing , and as  a re su lt com petition  be­
tw een p a rad ig m s cannot be reso lved  by proofs. R ather, 
th is  req u ire s  convincing  o r o therw ise, as K uhn saw  la te r 
and m ade clear, there is  only the  o ther a lte rn a tiv e  of 
tra n s la tin g  the one parad igm  into the other.
R epeated fa ilu re  of the no rm al scien tific  trad itio n  to 
solve a problem  or anom aly, g ives rise  to a trad ition - 
b reak ing  addition to no rm al scien tific  ac tiv ity , w hich in 
cases of c r is is  leads to a sc ien tific  revolu tion , th a t is  to a 
parad igm  shift. Such a parad igm  ad ju stm en t m eans a 
new “un ified” to tal v ision , re su ltin g  in  a changed  im age 
of science and changed data, n ecessita tin g  a redefin ition  
of a specific scien tific  area. M oreover, it is  b asica lly  a 
conversion  to a new attitude and view. A ctually , it is  a 
decision  based on faith  and th u s  a decisive choice w hich  
is  no t neu tra l.
3.3.2 F rom  the above it is  c lear th a t K uhn u ses  the  te rm  
parad igm  in  a global, to ta lita rian , com prehensive, basic, 
and  p rin c ip ia l sense, w hereby all four basic  m otives of 
h is  th in k in g  m an ifest them selves coherently . On the 
basis  of v a rio u s  c ritic ism s of the f irs t edition of The  
S truc tu re  o f S c ien tific  R evo lu tions, and espec ia lly  on the  
b as is  of the  c la rify in g  tex tua l an a ly s is  of M asterm an, 
K uhn now  ho lds a v iew poin t w hich show s som e m ore 
nuance. F o r the  sake of c la rity  le t u s  for the  rem ainder 
speak  about K uhn (2) over ag a in st K uhn ( l)42. On the  
b as is  of tex t research  M asterm an h as  com e to  the  conclu­
sion  th a t K uhn’s use  of the  te rm  p arad igm  fa lls  in to  m a in ­
ly  th ree  g roups, nam ely
(1) M etaphysical o r m etaparad igm s,
(2) socio logical p a rad ig m s and
(3) arte fac t p a rad ig m s o r co nstruc t p a rad ig m s43.
An in te res tin g  re su lt of her research  is  for exam ple  th a t
(1) and (2) is  broader, but (3) to the con tra ry  n a rro w er than  
a theory .
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The above leads K uhn (2) to acknow ledge the v a lid ity  of a 
d is tin c tio n  betw een (1) a d isc ip lin a ry  m a trix  (the socio lo ­
g ic a l p a rad ig m  accord ing  to M aste rm an ’s c h a ra c te r iz a ­
tion) and (2) an  ex em plary  o r better: a p rob lem -so lv ing  
parad ig m . The question  is, w hether the m ethod of div ide 
and  ru le  rea lly  so lves the  problem . It is  c lea r th a t K uhn
(2) s till rem a in s  open for the four basic  m otives of h is  
th o u g h t th a t w e m entioned, even though  he g ives them  a 
d ifferen t foundation  and a rticu la tio n  than  he used to. It is 
rem arkab le , how ever, th a t the  pow er of these  m otives 
becom es con tro lled  and th a t the  ou tp u t h a s  to be ch an n e l­
led anew. By m eans of a  ske tch  I w ill s im p ly  ind icate  a 
n um ber of aspects.
The soc ia l m otive a llow s K uhn, ju s t  a s  before, to pu t fu ll 
s tre s s  on the sc ien tific  com m unity , w ith  its  socia l com ­
m itm en ts . P arad ig m s a re  held  in  com m on by m em bers of 
a  sc ien tific  group. The rev e rse  of th is  is  th a t h av in g  such  
a  p a rad ig m  m akes it po ssib le  th a t o therw ise  v ery  d iffer­
en t people can  n ev erth e less  co n stitu te  one scien tific  
com m unity . By w ay  of em p irica l genera liza tio n s , K uhn
(2) su b sc rib es  to th is  c rite r iu m  for science as g roup  a c ti­
v ity , bu t he re jec ts  the idea th a t the c rite riu m  can  have the 
s ta tu s  of defin ition  and th u s  he k il ls  in  the  bud the  c irc u ­
la r  questio n  w hich  is  co n s titu tiv e  w ith  re sp ec t to the 
o th e r case. I th in k  th a t two reaso n s  can  be g iven  for th is.
One of them  is  th a t the h is to ric a l m otive req u ire s  th a t the 
concre te  and  ac tua l g row th  and ex istence  of sc ien tific  
g ro u p s  h a s  to be the p o in t of d ep a rtu re  (and no t a  g enera l 
log ica l defin ition  w hich is  based  on a log ica l reco n s tru c ­
tion  th a t a rg u es  p a s t h is to r ic a l d ifferences and u ses  the 
p resu p p o sed  m odel of a u n ify in g  science). In  addition, it 
ap p e a rs  th a t the phenom enon “sc ien tific  g ro u p ” canno t 
be eas ily  delim ited  by m eans of a  ‘one-one’ iden tifica tion  
w ith  the  object of re sea rch  as  such. A s it is  th is  req u ire s  
c lo se r re se a rc h  of sub -g ro u p s and  th e ir  ac tu a l sc ien tific  
activ ity .
In th is  w ay K u h n ’s in te llec tu a l s tru g g le  w ith  the problem  
of science show s a no tew orthy  and very  c la rify in g  deve­
lopm ent. L ogical P o s itiv ism  has  sim plified  the com plex  
n a tu re  of science w ith  the idea of a u n ifica tion  of science, 
h a v in g  p h y s ica lism  as its  b asic  denom inator. T his 
rig o ro u s  idea of sóience su re ly  can n o t do ju s tice  to the 
u n ity  and d iv e rs ity  of the sc ien tific  e n te rp r is e 44. K uhn 
h as  a ttem pted  to stem  th is  tide, am ong  o th e r th in g s
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because of pressures of h is second illum inating expe*i- 
ence about the way th ings work in the social sciences, and 
thus he has socialized the scientific process in a far- 
going way. N evertheless, Kuhn h im self originally  did 
take his departure from a too sim ple model of science, and 
his continued thinking about the com m itm ents of a 
scientific group as w ell as about the “com m unity struc­
ture of science” as a specific criterion of science, forced 
him to acknowledge and honour this com plexity in an in­
creasingly strong way. He achieved this am ong other 
things by pulling the m ost far-going scientific speciliza- 
tions w ithin his range. The correct distinction between 
more and le ss  com prehensive groups does not, however, 
suffice for founding disciplinary differences as such. And 
so the question arises whether analogous to the differ­
ence between types, sub-types and sub-sub-types, we also  
w ill need to acknowledge a fam ily of sub-paradigm s as a 
partial demarcation criterion. The consequences of this  
with respect to the decision about the nature of what is  as 
such scientific, present the follow ing problem: shall we 
have to determine basic agreem ents between sub-sub­
cases in line with the specified social structure of 
science?
In the second place Kuhn came to see that jo in ing a para­
digm to a schoolless, basically  agreeing, mature, normal 
science does not entirely do justice to the historic motive. 
For even in the so-called pre-paradigm phase the m em ­
bers of such a community still do show indications of a 
paradigm. In other words, scientific com m unities alw ays  
and everywhere exhibit definite commitments, though  
not alw ays in the sam e way. Therefore, the paradigm can 
not be used as a demarcation criterion for genuine  
science by reduction to the developm ental facet of actual 
science. The consequences of this change in accent are 
important. For it means that the historical m otive now  
takes its toll. At bottom this change with respect to the 
demarcation criterion for science show s in principle that 
the question “what is  science?” cannot be decided with  
the help of the question “how does science develop?”; 
even though the answer to the latter does g ive som e direc­
tion for detecting, understanding, and evaluating the 
basic characteristics of science and of being scientific. 
Here we have the important (cultural and historical) 
philosophical problem of the “lesson s of the past”.
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It a lso  m eans th a t Kuhn(2) canno t con tinue to  stand  
behind  h is  an a ly s is  of conversion  as  a  g esta lt sw itch  in  
w hich  case  conv incing  is  the  basic  procedure. R ather, 
re la tiv iz in g  the difference betw een pre-norm al, norm al, 
and  post-no rm al science, he is  now duty  bound to g ive a 
s tro n g e r accen tuation  to the  n a tu re  and m an n er of sy m ­
bolic tran s la tio n  in to  an o th er v iew po in t (i e an o th er se t of 
com m itm en ts in  p ecu lia r and d is tin c tiv e  in te rre la ­
tedness and coherence). A n in tr in s ic a lly  m ore im p o rtan t 
ro le  is  now also  assigned  to the socia l function  of sy m ­
bolic com m unication  (w ith the he lp  of the lin g u a l s tru c ­
tu re  as the  com bin ing  fac to r of a sc ien tific  com m un ity )45. 
T h is does m ean th a t the in co m m en su rab ility  s ta tu s  
becom es p rob lem atic46.
S tro n g er th a n  before, K uhn now  accen tua tes  and a n a ­
ly se s  the socia l lin g u a l com m unica tion  facto r n ex t to the 
soc ia l p sy ch ica l one as  the com m on facto r of a sc ien tific  
com m unity . In o rder to h onour the log ica l d is tinc tion  of 
m a in  and su b -g roups w ith in  a sc ien tific  “fam ily ”, on the 
b as is  of em p irica lly  observab le  g ivens  of a  v a rie ty  of 
sp ec ia liza tion , (p resen tin g  u s  w ith  the p rob lem s of 
com m unica tion  acro ss  g roup  boundaries), K uhn (2) now 
in troduces the te rm  d isc ip lin a ry  m atrix . “D isc ip lin a ry ” 
re fe rs  to the com m unal p o sse ss io n  of the p rac titio n e rs  of 
a p ro fess io n a l d isc ip line , and  “m a tr ix ” ex p la in s  the 
o rd erly  com position  of the d isc ip lin e  ou t of v a rio u s  e le ­
m e n ts47.
T his does no t m ean  th a t the pedagog ica l m otive is 
doom ed to silence. A ccord ing  both to K uhn (1) and (2), a 
sc ien tific  sp ec ia lty  g ro u p  is  held  to ge ther by com m on 
e lem en ts  in  tra in in g  and  education , w ith  resp o n sib ility  
for jo in tly  s e rv in g  a se t of shared  p u rp o ses  (includ ing  the 
p ro fess io n a l m ould ing  of successo rs), w ith  a la rg e ly  
com m on foundation  in  l i te ra tu re  and  its  in te rp re ta tio n , 
and  w ith  a  re la tiv e ly  rich  b as is  fo r m u tu a l ag reem en t and 
fo r com m unica tion  p o ssib ilitie s . H ow ever, Kuhn(2) 
jo in s  the ep istem o log ica l m otive  in  a p ecu lia r m an n er 
w ith  the  pedagog ica l one. A p a rt from  h is  v iew  on “osten- 
sion  as  a pedagogic too l”, K uhn a lso  p o in ts  ou t th a t 
w ith in  a  specific  d isc ip lin e  the sc ien tific  g ro u p  jo in tly , 
th a t is  unan im o u sly , and  w ith  genera l agreem ent, 
accep ts the  m ean in g  of illu m in a tin g  exam ples: exam ples 
w hich  in  fact in itia te  the you n g  sc ien tis t in to  the im p o r­
ta n t com m itm en ts  of the  group. In o th e r w ords these  
ex am p les  a re  p a r t of th e  cen tra l co g n itive  p o sse ss io n s  of
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the group. For both Kuhn(l) and (2) it is  essential that we 
acknowledge that such exem plars have cognitive func­
tions which preceed the specification of criteria w ith res­
pect to which they are paradigmatic or exemplary. That 
is, Kuhn(2) puts special value on assuring the in te g r ity  of 
the cognitive process as the basis for an adequate recon­
struction of scientific knowledge. This im plies that the 
em pirical content of theories m ust be admitted from  
above and from below and m ust not be lim ited in a priori 
fashion by a formal definition. This also im plies, w ith  
respect to the assim ilation  and storing of knowledge, the 
role of ep istem ological sim ilarities that m ay not be hand­
ed over to log ica l rigour (of e g definitions), and it im ­
p lies as w ell the relationships between nature, stim uli, 
perception and theory.
The problem of epistem ological sim ilarities forces Kuhn 
to work out h is own theory of knowledge in more detail, 
requiring special attention to the problem of perception, 
in connection with stim uli on the one hand, and theory 
formation on the other. Three factors play a very large 
role in Kuhn’s theory of knowledge: the possib ility  of 
sim ulating stim uli through a computer (thereby render­
ing a technical analogy); an ontological factor in the role 
of a kind of adapted A ristotelian c la ss doctrine and 
classification  theory (once again and in a new w ay  
m aking the question of nature important, among others 
with respect to an appeal to evidence); and a pedagogical 
factor (the ‘Johny exam ple’ g ives a privileged status to 
the learning process and draws problem s of the theory of 
knowledge w ithin the lingual-sym bolic framework of the 
learning of nam es for d istinctions)48.
The additional material and specification Kuhn fur­
n ishes regarding details of h is theory of knowledge  
brings us, at least from the view point of the philosopher’s 
interest, to the crown of Kuhn’s science problem atics. 
Now the h ighest time has come to ask ourselves what has 
become of the former significance of the paradigm, the so  
called m etaphysical paradigm. The solution of th is  
puzzle in the thinking of both K uhn(l) and (2) produces 
disillusionm ent and offers a benevolent consolation to 
the philosopher specia list (with apologies to Feyera- 
bend!).
The d isillu sion in g  aspect is  that Kuhn(2) no longer con­
siders the term paradigm suitable as such to indicate the
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com m on facto r of a sc ien tific  com m unity : sc ien tific  
com m un ities  are indeed the “p ro d u cers  and v a lid a to rs  of 
sc ien tific  know ledge” and seen  in  th is  w ay the  c u rren t 
op in ion  is  th a t in a sc ien tific  com m unity  the th in g  held in 
com m on specifica lly  is  a theory , and not a p a rad ig m  in 
the sense  of “the en tire  co n ste lla tio n  of beliefs, values, 
techn iques, and so on shared  by the  m em bers of a g iven  
co m m u n ity ”. In view  of the fact, how ever, th a t the te rm  
theo ry  is  u su a lly  em ployed in  a re s tr ic tiv e  m anner, 
Kuhn(2) now in troduces the te rm  d isc ip lin a ry  m a trix  in 
its  stead.
The d is illu s io n in g  asp ec t is  th a t Kuhn(2) no longer con­
sid ers  the te rm  p arad ig m  su itab le  as  such  to ind icate  the 
com m on fac to r of a sc ien tific  com m unity : scien tific  
com m unities  are  indeed the “p roducers  and v a lid a to rs  of 
sc ien tific  know ledge” and seen  in  th is  w ay the cu rren t 
op in ion  is  th a t in a sc ien tific  com m unity  the th in g  held  in 
com m on specifically  is a theory , and not a p arad ig m  in  
the  sense  of “the en tire  co n ste lla tio n  of beliefs, values, 
techn iques, and so on shared  by the  m em bers of a g iven 
co m m u n ity ”. In view  of the fact, how ever, th a t the te rm  
theo ry  is  u su a lly  em ployed in  a re s tr ic tiv e  m anner, 
K uhn(2) now in troduces the te rm  d isc ip lin a ry  m a tr ix  in 
its  stead.
The conso la tion  is  th a t Kuhn(2) em p h asises  th a t “a p a ra ­
digm  g o verns . . .  no t the sub jec t m a tte r  but ra th e r  a g roup  
of p ra c titio n e rs”49. N ot o n ly  because the soc ia l fac to r is  
now  g iven  ce rta in  lim ita tio n s  w ith  re sp ec t to the decision  
w h at sh a ll p ro p erly  be called  a science, but a lso  because 
in  th is  w ay “n a tu re ” does s till get p r io r ity  w ith  re sp ec t to 
the  ca rd in a l p roblem  of idea and  re a li ty 50. Or, a t any  rate , 
n a tu re  (or w hatev e r te rm  K uhn m ay  use  for th is) is  a t 
le a s t no t m ade com plete ly  dependent w ith  re sp ec t to the 
ro le  of in te llec tu a l com m itm ents, a s  the la tte r  p lay  a ro le  
in  the herm en eu tica l problem . In th is  w ay the p h ilo so ­
p h er s til l  does rece ive  som e room  to breathe. F or the d is ­
c ip lin a ry  m a tr ix  co n ta in s  a o (1) sym bolic  g e n e ra liz a ­
tions; (2) shared  com m itm en ts (the so called  m e ta p h y s i­
cal parad ig m s) w hich  K uhn now  concre tizes as m odels 
th a t supp ly  the  g roup  w ith  an a lo g ies  and m e tapho rs , and 
he lp  them  to de term ine  w hat can  be accepted  as  e x p la n a ­
tion  and as puzzle so lu tion , lead ing  to an  en tire  spec tru m  
from  h e u ris tic  to on to log ical; (3) v a lu es  (e g of s im p lic ity , 
consistency , p robab ility , etc) w hich  a re  u su a lly  shared  
on a  b roader b as is  th an  the ju s t  m entioned  tw o fac to rs  by
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sc ien tis ts , and can  be view ed as de te rm in in g  fac to rs  w ith  
resp ec t to p red ic tion  and evalua tion  of theories; and 
w hich  a re  also  app lied  in  ind iv idually  d iffering  w ays, 
though  s till rem a in in g  im p o rtan t d e te rm in in g  fac to rs  of 
g roup  behav iour; and (4) (illum inative) ex am p les51.
In esp ec ia lly  the above m entioned  (2) and (3) som eth ing  
rem a in s  of the global, persp ec tiv a l, ra th e r  sy n tac tica l 
th an  sem an tica l m ean ing  of p arad ig m  w hich  m ade the 
v iew s of K uhn(l) so in tr ig u in g  and w hich  stim u la ted  
such  a w ide d iscussion . The final re su lts  of K uhn’s 
m atu red  v iew s are no t m ere ly  “hum  drum  socio log ical 
po in ts  of in fo rm ation  th a t have been know n long  
before” . H ow ever, i t  is  only  “som eth ing” th a t rem ains: 
ju s t as in  the case  of the reac tio n ary  A yer in  fo rm er tim es, 
K uhn(l) m akes a g rea te r im p ressio n  because of the 
p h ilo so p h ica l m ethod w hich  show s considerab le  pow er, 
dares to take  r isk s , and ap p roaches the ex trem e lim its  of 
a w ide perspective . E ven though  the po lem ica l v a lu e  of a 
v iew po in t in  w hich K uhn c lea rly  s tuck  ou t h is  neck h a s  
been devaluated , it can  n ev erth e less  be said, I th ink , th a t 
Kuhn(2) com es c lo ser to a m ore pow erfu l in s ig h t in to  and  
o rd erin g  of facto rs  of the theory  of science, inc lud ing  
basic  p h ilo so p h ica l p rob lem s52. Thus, Kuhn(2) s till ho lds 
on to the p o ssib ility  of v iew ing  the  w orld  to ta lly  d iffer­
en tly  from  two p o in ts  of view. But he accounts for th is  by 
m eans of th e  ep istem olog ical d im ension  of stim uli. A t 
th is  p o in t I believe th a t th e  on to log ical lim it of the  spec­
tru m  of com m itm en ts and the  ro le  of n a tu re  w ith  respect 
to  s tim u li, ce rta in ly  needs to be w orked out fu rth e r and to 
be clarified: com puter s im u la tio n  of s tim u li is  an  im p o r­
ta n t experim en t, but a t the  sam e tim e, th is  facet of the  
n eu ra l fac to r is  the  m ost obvious and sim ple  analogy  and 
not a ll th a t th e re  a re  to an  adequate  ep istem ology. T his 
also  is  tru e  fo r the  ro le  of v a lu es  in  science, th a t is  to  say  
th e  n o rm ativ e  p rob lem atics of the  s tru c tu re  of science, 
w h ich  K uhn, s till bound to trad ition , on ly  h es itan tly  
beg ins to  trea t.
Indeed, (2) and (3) m entioned above do con ta in  som e 
p h ilo so p h ica l consolation , though  u n fo rtu n a te ly  no 
m ore th an  th is: not a ll sc ien tis ts  acco rd ing  to K uhn are  
com m itted in th is  way! These com ponents of the  d isc ip li­
n a ry  m a tr ix  also  con tain  p rom ise  of in te llec tu a l s u r ­
p rise s  w hen fu rth er w orked out, e sp ec ia lly  if K uhn w ould 
do a little  sh a rp en in g  up of h is  theo ry  of know ledge. 
K uhn(l) and (2) are  of course not to ta lly  d ifferen t persons.
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K uhn rem a in s  fa ith fu l to h im se lf in  h is  basic  in ten tions, 
even  th ough  the  co n tin u ity  of h is  th o u g h t from  tim e to 
tim e  b rin g s  a lo n g  d ifferent and som etim es new  accents, 
in s ig h ts  and in tu itio n s. It seem s th a t th is  is  possib le  
th a n k s  to K uhn’s b r illia n t h an d lin g  and ap p lica tio n  of 
the four m otives of h is  th in k in g  w hich  we h ave  m en­
tioned  above, accord ing  to the need and n ecessity  of the 
m om ent.
4. F ina lly , som e rem a rk s  about the s ig n ificance  of 
K u h n ’s theo ry  of science. In m y op in ion  K uhn co rrectly  
em phasized  the  m ore o r le ss  dogm atic, u n c ritic a l a ttitude 
of th e  av erage  sc ien tis t busy  w ith  re sea rch  on scien tific  
p rob lem s or ra th e r  puzzles  and th e ir  so lu tions. 
“U n critic a l”, no t in  the sense  of u n c ritic a l h an d lin g  of 
sc ien tific  tools, m ethods, re search , d iscu ssio n , etc., bu t in 
the  sense of (u sua lly  u n co n sc io u sly ) la ck in g  c ritiq u e  
w ith  re sp ec t to one’s own p o in t of d ep a rtu re  and o ne’s 
ow n m o tives (the “v a lu e s” used  w ith in  a certa in  
sc ien tific  com m unity). I believe th a t fac tu a lly  sp eak in g  
and  broad ly  sp eak in g  th is  is  correct: ‘d o gm atic ’ u n d er­
g ird s  ‘c r it ic a l’. W hether th is  is  so as  a re su lt of certa in  
ph ilo so p h ica l in fluences w hich w orked th ro u g h  specific  
science trad itio n s , and w hat these  w ould be, is  an o th er 
question , w hich can  no t now  be d iscussed . In  the above 
sketched  view  it  seem s then  th a t fac tu a lly  K uhn is  c loser 
to  the  tru th  th a n  Popper, w ith  h is  v iew  of tru ly  no rm al 
sc ience  a s  b asica lly  c r itic a l and a lw ay s  look ing  for 
in s ta n ces  w hich  can  fa ls ify  the re su lts  and  h ypo theses  
th a t a re  cu rren t, th u s  v iew ing  the sc ien tific  com m unity  
as  a th o rough ly  open and undogm atic  com m unity . I 
shou ld  add, of course, th a t w h a t I h ave  ju s t sa id  ho lds ju s t 
in  case  P o p p er’s c r itic a l a ttitu d e  is  m ore th an  a m ere ly  
m e th o d o lo g ica l-in stru m en ta l approach . Of course, in 
add ition  to m any  v a lu ab le  in s ig h ts , P opper a lso  in th is  
re sp ec t does have a co n trib u tio n  to m ake, e sp ec ia lly  in so 
fa r a s  h is  view  ind ica tes  the  ideal w hich  the p rac tice  of 
sc ience ough t to approach , n am ely  a  r ig o ro u s  te s tin g  of 
o ne’s ow n hypo theses, to see w h eth er they  can be m a in ­
ta ined , and a con tin u a l in v e s tig a tio n  in to  the questio n  as 
to w h eth er the  accepted  re su lts  and th eo rie s  are  c ritic a lly  
up to date.
H ow ever, in  the  fina l a n a ly s is  th is  ideal is  no t co-exten­
sive  w ith  th e  re a lity  of sc ien tific  p ra c tic e 51. The ap p are n t 
reaso n  fo r th is  is  im p o rtan t. “N orm al sc ien ce”, th a t is  to
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say  the  everyday  p rac tice  of science w ith in  sc ien tific  d is ­
c ip lines, h a s  developed in to  a  sp ec ia lis tic  trea tm en t of 
the de ta ils  of a ce rta in  d iscip line . C onsequently , the 
c ritic a l a ttitu d e  th a t shou ld  have begun to in v estig a te  
and questio n  p h ilo soph ica l bases, have been in  the  deep 
freeze for m any  decades. Thus, we w ere no lo n g e r su ffi­
c ien tly  p liab le  to reflect on our own a ssu m p tio n s  and p re ­
su p p o sitio n s  of accepted theories, h y p o th eses  and 
axiom s. Of course, no t every  sp ec ia lis t needs to  s tr iv e  for 
the ideal to becom e o r try  to be a  ph ilosopher. B ut it w ould 
be to h is  ow n de trim en t if he lo st the road tow ards broad 
con tex tua l re la tio n sh ip s , ph ilo soph ica l b asic  q u estio n s  
and the cen tra l theory  of science w hich d irec ts  and  gu ides 
h is  thought. In  the  sam e w ay, a  d ilem m a w ould  ap p ea r if 
the p h ilo so p h er w ould sh rin k  back from  detailed  
problem  research  w hich  w ould u ltim ate ly , and often v ery  
soon a lready , land  h im  in specu la tion  and m e tap h y sica l 
d ream  castles . N ot only  w hat is called  “C ritica l T heo ry”, 
but also  the  in tense  in te re s t in m etasc ien tific  p rob lem s in 
the recen t past, is p roof for the fact th a t we face a se rio u s  
p roblem  here, but a lso  for the fact th a t there  is  a tendency 
in the r ig h t d irection  even if it is  s till a b it too safe and 
even if som e of the cen tra l p rob lem s a re  s till p assed  by.
K uhn h as  em phasized  the need for new theo ries  w ith  
th e ir  p arad ig m atic  consequences, in  o rder to do ju s tice  to 
the fac ts  and to the s ta te  of affa irs  in  a scien tific  area , and 
he h a s  a lso  em phasized  the s ign ificance of ex tra -o rd i­
n a ry  in q u ir ie s  in to  science in  response  to anom alies. 
T h is is  a  va lu ab le  d im ension  of h is  w ork. But th e  q u es­
tio n  rem a in s  w hether K uhn’s so lu tion  is  su ffic ien tly  
rad ical. Both K uhn and P opper reac t to th e  p re su p p o s i­
tio n s  of P ositiv ism , especia lly  L ogical P ositiv ism , and 
th ey  offer im p o rtan t new  po in ts  of view . H owever, 
K uhn’s m edicine is  p a r tia lly  neu tra lized  and m ade in ­
effective by h is  p resen tly  som ew hat re la tiv ized  d iv ision  
of science in to  dogm atica lly  no rm al and c ritic a lly  e x tra ­
o rd in ary  sc ience54. The r ig h t persp ec tiv e  seem s to  m e to 
be th a t the  p rac tice  of science m ust ac tu a lly  a lw ays 
s tr iv e  a fte r an  ideal, even though  it is  no t a lw ays realized  
because ou r sub jective  behav iour and no rm s are not iden ­
tical. But the  no rm  does req u ire  th a t the  sc ien tis t in  the  
w ork  of h is  re search  p rog ram , in  look ing  for new facts, in  
so lv in g  p rob lem s and puzzles, in v iew ing  re la tio n sh ip s , 
etc., w ill a t le a s t try  to  becom e and rem ain  c ritic a lly  con­
scious of h is  ow n v iew poin t, of h is  ow n p resu p p o sitio n s
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and  th e  im p lic a tio n s  of h is  theo ry  o r theories, and th a t he 
w ill fa ir ly  com pare  h is  own w ith  those  of o thers. T his 
m ean s  th a t every  sc ien tis t, a lso  the  ph ilo so p h ica l spe­
c ia lis t, w ill force h im se lf from  tim e to  tim e to  look over 
h is  own sho u ld er in  o rder to ga in  a reflective  view  of h is  
ow n foundations and b asic  m otives. T his need not a lw ays 
n e c e ssa rily  lead  to  th e ir  rejection , no t even to  th e ir  adap ­
ta tio n  and correction , but it w ill a lw ay s lead to  a check-up 
a s  to  w h e th e r o r  no t th e  safe ty  p lu g s  are  s till func tion ing  
p u rp o s iv e ly  o r w h eth er they  h av e  a lread y  becom e a n ti­
quated  o r h av e  been connected to  a cu rren t th a t is  no 
lo n g e r able to  c a rry  th e  load. F urtherm ore , in  th is  w ay  it 
w ill be e a s ie r  to  X -ray  any  c rack s  in  the  w all of p referred  
theo ries , and  p ro g re ss  of science can co n tin u a lly  be h e lp ­
ed by tim ely  rem edies, w hich  a re  be tte r th a n  le ttin g  
th in g s  go u n til a  c r is is  o r a  shock  adap ta tion , i e a  rev o lu ­
tion, is  unavoidable . The la tte r  co u ld  e a s ily  h ap p en  sim ­
p ly  because th e  n ecessa ry  p h ilo so p h ica l in te re s t and the 
a b ility  to  c r itic a lly  te s t one’s ow n v iew s a re  often not 
th o u g h t to  be in h e re n t d im ensions of th e  n o rm al p rac tice  
of science, as  a  re su lt of an  in a d eq u a te  v iew  of norm a- 
t iv ity  and th e  fac tu a lly  given.
K uhn h as  g iven  us usefu l a n a ly se s  abou t the com m unity  
s tru c tu re  of science. K uhn h as  a lso  po in ted  ou t in  h is  a n a ­
ly se s  th a t the ab lest sc ie n tis ts  a re  often m em bers of m ore 
th a n  one sub  group. H ow ever, he h as  no t p ro p e rly  seen 
the m a n n e r in  w hich  the ac tiv itie s  of ev ery  sub  o r sub-sub  
g ro u p  affect one ano ther. In  h is  theo ry  of the s tru c tu re s  of 
society , J A L  T a ljaa rd  h a s  used  the  B ib lical im age of the 
“bread  and  g ra in  k e rn e ls” as  a m ethodolog ical d irec­
tiv e 55, w ith  s tr ik in g  on to log ical im p lica tions.
Of course , an  im age like  th a t h as  its  lim its  of app lica tion . 
If u sed  c ritica lly , it seem s to me, how ever, th a t it w ould be 
a  se rv iceab le  ind ica to r of the road we have to go in  o u r 
co n tem p o rary  socia l th eo ries  and sp ec ifica lly  in  ou r 
view  of the  s tru c tu re s  of society , w ith in  w hich  ou r 
C h ris tian  sc ien tific  s tud ies  m u s t flou rish . The m ixing , 
the q u a lity  and  the p ro cess in g  of the g ra in  k ern e ls  w ill 
indeed de term ine w hat the bread  is  go ing  to look like  as 
fa r  a s  th e  sub jec tive  and in h e ren t com m itm en ts  a re  con­
cerned. It is  c lea r  th a t the  a rtif ic ia l w a lls  th a t have  been 
erected  esp ec ia lly  by the  P o s itiv is tic  trad itio n  w ill have 
to  c rack  up. The p ro g re ss  of science, even  th e  p o ssib ility  
of p ro g ress , w ill depend on w h eth er sc ien tific  g ro u p s
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from  v a rio u s  d isc ip lin es  am ongst one another, and the 
sc ien tific  com m unity  (sc ien tis tica lly  and  techno log i­
ca lly  con tro lled  as  it i s 56) to ge ther w ith  the  o ther com m u­
n itie s  in  ou r society , w ill in  a  tru ly  c ritic a l but a lso  in ­
te llec tu a lly  co n stru c tiv e  fash ion  accept th e ir  m u tu a lly  
d ifferen tiated  ta sk s . T hese ta sk s , of course, do not only 
concern th e  con tro l of natu re , bu t a lso  the  deploym ent 
and  its  care  as G od’s creation . A nd these  ta sk s  w ill have 
to  be accepted, not by ru n n in g  aw ay  w ith  the  facts, bu t by 
a ttem p tin g  to un d ers tan d  th e ir  m ean ing  in  a  no rm ative  
(different from , but in c lu siv e  of descrip tive!) m an n er57. 
The s tru g g le  of science th eo re tic ian s  such  as  K uhn (and 
h ere  and th e re  a lso  the  dera ilm en ts) seem  to be espe­
c ia lly  in s tru c tiv e  for acq u irin g  in s ig h t in to  the  com ­
p lex ity  of th is  k ind  of p ro b lem atics58.
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R E F E R E N C E S
* Sincere thanks are due to my friend Hendrik Hart for h is help with 
the translation of the m anuscript at the publication “deadline".
1 ‘Science here taken in a global sense, like “W issenschaft”, and not 
restricted to the natural sciences. ‘S ociety’ intended in a global 
sense as well, not excluding ‘social reality’.
2 A9-10/B13-14, here quoted in the English translation of N K 
Smith, Im m a n u e l K a n t’s  C ritique o f Pure Reason. London, Mac­
m illan, 1956 (1929), 51.
3 Ibid, A11-14/B23-28 (Edition W Weischedel. Darmstadt, Wissen- 
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956, Bd II, 61-65).
4 Ibid, B22 (Edition W Weischedel, 61).
5 The natural result of an exem plary focusing on the K antian  heri­
tage — for reasons of space — is  of course a reduced historical 
perspective, which glides over the factual historical relation 
between Marx and Hegel, as well as the actual development of 
philosophical ideas in modern tim es, not to mention text book 
dilem m as like Rationalism  and Em piricism . A worthwhile 
correction could be com parison of perspective from the ‘platform ’ 
of e g G EADNITZKY, C ontem porary schoo ls o f metascience-, 3rd 
enlarged edition, three volum es in one. Chicago, Regnery, 1973.
6 “Thesen tiber Feuerbach”, no 11, cf especially  1, 2 & 8.
7 An interesting elucidation e g in the "Deutsche Ideologie”.
8 Cf especially  h is important study N ega tive  D ia lektik . Frankfurt 
am Main, Suhrkamp, 1966.
9 To mention just one exam ple, J Dewey’s “Does human nature 
change?” in the Rotarian Magazine, vol 52, no 2, Feb 1946, 8 sqq.
10 For exam ple M FOUCAULT in his study The A rchaeo logy o f 
kn o w led g e ; translated from the French by A M S Smith. London, 
Tavistock, 1969 and P RICOEUR, Le con flit des interprëta tions; 
e ssa is  d ’herm éneutique. Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1969, or — in an 
even more topical setting — h is “Science et idéologie", R evu e  
p h ilo so p iq u e  de L ouvain , 72 (Quatriême série, no 14), Mai 1974, 
328-355.
11 “Philosophic a ls  strenge W issenschaft”, L ogos  1 ,1910-11,289-341.
12 H olzw ege  being a strik ing but by no m eans exclu sive example.
13 A noteworthy outcome of th is trend is  the role accorded in certain 
quarters to an Ethics of science in order to involve the “normative 
problematics" — in itia lly  encapsulated by Logical Positivism  
and later on treated in a psychologistic fashion in “em otive theo­
ries” — in the d iscussions of science theoreticians. Cf a o, the 
interesting reaction of K-O APEL, Transform ation  der P h ilo ­
sophic; Bd II. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1973, 358 sqq.
14 For exam ple BLACK, M, C ritical th inking: A n  In troduction  to 
L ogic  and S c ien tific  M ethod; 2nd ed Englewood Cliffs, Prentice- 
Hall, and M odels and M etaphors: S tu d ie s  in  L anguage and P h ilo ­
sophy. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1960; 
BRAITHWAITE, R B, S c ien tific  explanation: A  s tu d y  o f the fu n c­
tion  o f Theory, P robab ility  and L aw  in science. Cambridge, Uni­
versity Press, 1968 (1953); POPPER, K R, The L og ic  o f sc ien tific  
discovery. London, Hutchinson, 1972 (1959) and som e essays in 
C onjectures and R efu ta tions; the grow th o f sc ien tific  know ledge. 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1972 (1963); PRICE, H H, T h in k ­
in g  and experience. London, Hutchinson U niversity Library, 
*1969 (1953).
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15 For example, J Kockelmans.
16 For exam ple through influence exerted by w ritings of W Steg- 
miiller.
17 See the important analysis of this problem atics in D ew ey’s 
thought world by H HART, Communal certa in ty and authorized  
truth; an Exam ination of John D ew ey’s P h ilosoph y of Verifica­
tion. Amsterdam, Swets & Zeitlinger, 1966. J HABERMAS treated 
the social facet of attitudes towards public disclosure in an intri­
guing manner in his Strukturw andel der Offentlichkeit; Unter- 
suchungen zu einer Kategorie der biirgerlichen G esellschaf. (5 
Aufl Sonderausg Neuwied) Luchterhand, 1971 (1962).
18 A basic study with a valuable com prehensive bibliography is R K 
MERTON's, The Socio logy o f science; Theoretical and Em pirical 
Investigations; edited and with an Introduction by N W Storer. 
Chicago & London, University of Chicago Press, 1973.
19 An exceptionally high standard of scientific research reporting 
his “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research  
Programm es’1 in I LAKATOS & A MUSGRAVE (ed), C riticism  
and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge, U niversity Press, 1970, 
91-196. (Abbreviated as CATGOK).
20 APEL, K - O, Transform ation derPhilosophie; Bd II. Frankfurt am 
Main, Suhrkamp, 1973, 7 sqq; HABERMAS, J, Theorie und 
Praxis; Sozia lph ilosoph ische Studien; 3. Aufl Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp, 1974, especially  307 sqq; SCHULZ, W, P hilosophie in 
der veranderten Welt. Pfullingen, Neske, 1974, 12 sqq.
21 HANSON, N R, Patterns of d iscovery. An in qu iry  in to the concep­
tual foundations of science. Cambridge, University Press, 1958.
22 A lively  g ist of his approach in his television  d iscussion  with N 
Chomsky, see F ELDERS (ed). R eflex ive water; the basic concerns 
of mankind. London, Souvenir Press, 1974, s v “Human nature: 
Justice versus power”, 133 sqq.
23 An interesting collection of essays of M POLANYI is  Marjorie 
Grene s K ow ing and being; es sa ys  by Michael Polanyi. Chicago, 
University of Chicago, 1969.
24 Though of course so lely  responsible for my own tentative ven­
tures in this essay, I gratefully mention the intellectual stim ula­
tion of d iscussions with my colleague and friend H G Stoker on 
topics related to the philosophy of science, and look forward to the 
publication of his research results in this area.
25 My approach accentuates a specific perspective on the sig n ifi­
cance of Kuhn's view s, an approach which I do consider illum ina­
tive but which to a large extent is absent in relevant contem ­
porary literature; I am quite aware that alternative philosophical 
models could possibly — and som e indeed do — h ighlight facets 
subdued in my sketch.
26 1st ed 1962; 2nd ed, enlarged, 1970 (Chicago, University of Chica­
go Press). Furtheron abbreviated as TSOSR. Important critical 
essays on Kuhn's v iew s in Criticism  and the grow th of know ledge  
(see footnote 19 above) and F SUPPE, (ed). The structure of sc ien ­
tific Theories. Urbana, Chicago, London, University of Illinois  
Press, 1974, (abbreviated TSOST), both containing essays and 
replies by Kuhn as well. Important ’Book R eview s’ include J 
AGASSI in Journal of the H istory  of Philosophy, 4, 1966, 351-4; A 
E MUSGRAVE in British  Journal for the P h ilosoph y of Science,
22, 1971. 287-306; I SCHEFFLER, “Vision and Revolution: A Post­
script on Killin ' in Philosophy of science  39. 1972, 366-374; and
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especially  D SHAPERE, “The Structure of scientific Revo­
lutions”, The P hilosophical R eview , 73,1964,383-394 & “The Para­
digm Concept”, Science, 172, 1971, 706-709. An excellent 'micro- 
paedic’ perspective on Kuhn’s position in the philosophy of 
science is  furnished by T KISIEL & G JOHNSON, “New philo­
sophies of science in the USA; a se lective survey”, Zeitsch riit fur 
allgem eine W issenschaftstheorie, V/ l ,  1974, 138-191.
27 Interesting autobiographical details in TSOSR, v  sqq.
28 On this point influence of A E Lovejoy is  m ost probable.
29 E specially D SHAPERE (see footnote 26). Like, e g, Musgrave, 294 
(see footnote 26 above) and in a certain sense also J KEKES, 
“Fallibilism  and R ationality”, A m erican  Philosoph ical Q uarter­
ly , 9 (4), 1972, 30-309, cf especially  307, I do not consider Kuhn’s 
supposed “Irrationalism ” and “R elativism ” proved (but com­
pare footnote 32), though h is rebuttal (e g TSOSR, 191 sqq and 205 
sqq, as w ell as ‘D iscussion’, 508, in TSOST  — see footnote 26 above 
—, & “Reflections on my critics” in CATGOK, 234 and 259 sqq, 
(cited above in footnote 19) doesn't seem  to be fu lly  to the point or 
detailed. To my mind Kuhn’s “Subjectivism ” (members of a scien­
tific group being the sole audience and judges) as far as the theory 
of science is  concerned, is  afar^ iore serious issue. Lakatos' idea 
of criticism  in CATGOK, especially  179-180, as w ell as scholarly  
d iscussions on the context of justification demonstrates my point 
from a different angle.
30 Important epistem ological expositions especially  in Kuhn’s 
contribution “Second Thoughts on Paradigm s” in TSOST  (cited 
above footnote 26).
31 H V STOPES-ROE’s well balanced book review in the B ritish  
Journal for the ph ilo soph y of science  15, 1964-65, 158-161, e g, 
underscores the pedagogic factor, without, however, m entioning  
its connection to the other factors; the reader accordingly doesn’t 
get an im age of Kuhn's view  in its totality. Kuhn h im self merely 
juxtaposes these factors without treating their interrelatedness 
as such, cf e g h is “Second thoughts on Paradigm s” in TSOST, 471.
32 Cf e g, Kuhn’s appraisal of logic in "Logic of d iscovery or p sy ­
chology of research?” in CATGOK  (cited above footnote 26), 15. 
This remark is  not intended to exclude affinities between the two 
philosophical trends, cf my “Grepe uit die kontemporêre wysbe- 
geerte” in D ie A toom eeu in U Lig. Potchefstroom, I B C, 1969, (76­
112) 90 sqq. As far as Kuhn's own philosophical position in con­
temporary thought is concerned, it seem s to me that Kuhn — 
though more advanced — has his roots prim arily in what I have 
termed ‘Philosophy of grounded commitment' (p 97 sqq), not 
excluding other affinities to and reactions against contemporary 
trends; J Watkins' critique of Kuhn (a kind of 'construction 
method’ — c f “A gainst ‘normal science’ ” in CATGOK, 26) should  
be viewed in this perspective too, it seem s, as a faint echo of the 
(Logical) P ositiv istic tradition. A ffin ities w ithL ovejoy’s ‘history  
of ideas’ approach is  noticeable — though often concealed beneath 
the surface — in Kuhn’s use of illustrative exam ples when treat­
ing the history of science — an hermeneutic factor m issed by 
Watkins.
33 “Reflections on my Critics” in CATGOK, 238.
34 Ibid, 240.
35 M L  SCHAGRIN, “On being unreasonable", P hilosoph y of 
science, March 1973, 1-9, g ives a very readable digression on this
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topic. Moreover, the specific goal(s) of science are scarcely  
broached.
36 Quoted above footnote 5.
37 Cf, e g, Lakatos 140 & 177 sqq as w ell as Kuhn 262-3 in CATGOK  
(footnote 19 above); the ghost of ‘Subjectivism ’ (cf footnote 29 
above) rem ains though!
38 Neither history nor the subjective activity of the scientist (inclu­
ding his constellation of beliefs, values and im peratives) seem s 
appropriate to furnish the criteria for science as such in an u lti­
mate sense; cf footnote 29 above.
39 TSOSR, 3 sqq.
40 A digest compiled from statements especially  in TSOSR, toge­
ther with relevant expositions elsewhere; for reasons of space 
individual documentation could not be considered.
COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED.
41 Cf remark footnote 40 above. I accordingly steer clear of accentua­
tions representative specifically  of Kuhn’s “modified v iew s” in 
recent publications. Important studies regarding Kuhn’s para­
digm concept include Shapere (quoted above footnote 26) and arti­
cles by I Lakatos. M Masterman & J Watkins in CATGOK  (see 
footnote 19 above). Masterman’s study is  especially  helpful.
42. Follow ing Kuhn’s own humorous exam ple (“Reflections on my 
critics”, in CATGOK, 231) but in a more serious vein.
43 MASTERMAN, Margaret, “The nature of a paradigm” in 
CATGOK, 65.
44 Cf, a o the following instructive studies of H G Stoker: “Die een- 
heid van die wetenskap”, Philosophia Reform ats, 33, 1968, 1-31; 
118-136 (Summary in English 136-148) & “Die beginsel:eenheiden  
differensiasie”, K oers  30,1962,20-45 (both reprinted in O orsprong  
en rigting, I. Kaapstad, Tafelberg, 1970).
45 “Second thoughts on Paradigm s” in TSOST, cf especially  473 sqq  
and 503 sqq.
46 Cf TSOSR, 198 sqq & “Reflections on my critics” in CATGOK, 266 
sqq.
47 TSOSR, 182.
48 Within all three factors the “em pirical” zoom s in to a new focus. 
The remarkable fact is that after Kuhn’s subversive polem ics 
with (Logical) Positivism  — which even supplied h is approach 
with the tag ‘Idealism' — we now find Kuhn(2) close to an (episte- 
m ological) Em piricism, and here and there in the vicin ity of some 
pure bred Positivists.
49 TSOSR, 180.
50 Cf m y exposition above, p 334, on the ‘Kantian heritage’. It is  
important to note that th is notorious issue in Idealism  turns up in  
20th century outfit not only with regard to the hermeneutic prob­
lem but also in the role accorded to ‘model’ (cf, e g, I Lakatos, 
“Falsification and the Methodology of scientific research pro­
gram s” in CATGOK, 135: “models sim ulating reality”), analogy, 
resemblance, etc, — ‘structure’ often replacing .system ’ (in its 
Early Modern connotation) and ‘system ’ becom ing a technical 
artefact.
51 Cf TSOSR, 182-187.
52 Facets of science like, e g, analogy, metaphor, lingual identifica­
tion, meaning-determiners, data, the m apping and com parison of 
theories, “intellectual frameworks” and beliefs, scientific com ­
mitments and the internal and external relations of science, etc.
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This is an important task also confronting scientists with Chris­
tian religious com m itments, a task that is just beginning to bear 
its first fruits in (Calvinistic) Christian scientific studies.
53 Margaret Masterman, “The nature of a paradigm" in CATGOK, 60 
takes this for granted too easily , as it seem s to me. Both Kuhn and 
Popper have underscored real characteristics of science, but one­
sidedly; in this respect their polem ics mean a valuable correction 
of each other. Both get stuck, though, as it seem s, in subjective 
(group) attitudes and values (Kuhn) or ideals (Popper). Lakatos, 
op cit, 138 (footnote 52 above) has stated correctly, I think: “. . . 
history of science,w ithout philosophy of science is blind”; but I 
m ay perhaps add: and philosophy of science without a normative 
philosophical basic idea (or herm eneutic key and, pace  Lakatos, 
not m erely a heuristic study) is  blind, in any case colour-blind.
54 It may be true, generally speaking, that “. . .  only when they must 
choose between com peting theories do scientists behave like 
philosophers" (Kuhn, "Logic of discovery or psychology of re­
search?” in CATGOK, 7). But I think Kuhn should look into the 
matter in detail why that happens usually  only in tim es of crisis  
and should present us with the reasons and directing factors bear­
ing on this fact. We here touch, so it seem s, on Kuhn’s blind spot as 
far as the P ositiv istic tradition is concerned: clum siness as 
regards the norm ative problem atics on the one hand, and an 
inadequate perspective on the history of philosophy on the other 
hand. I su ggest that the role of com peting theories is more impor­
tant and also not quite what Kuhn would let us believe.
55 J A L TALJAARD, “Graankorrel en brood: Gedagtes oor 'n Skrif- 
m atige Sam elew ingsleer met besondere aandag aan die Staat”, 
P erspek tief (Potchefstroom) 10 (2&3) Sept 1971, 92-108.
56 Cf, e g, ELLUL, J, The technological Society; tran sl from the 
French b y  J W ilkinson, with an Introd b y  R K  Merton. London, 
Cape, 1965; JASPERS, K,Vom  Ursprung undZiel der Geschichte. 
Frankfurt, Fischer, 1957,81 sqq & SCHULZ, W, Philosophie in der 
veránderten Welt. Pfullingen, Neske, 1974, 12 sqq.
57. This m eans in ter a lia  getting rid of “creative reason theories” (in 
either R ationalistic or Irrationalistic garb) and constructing  
really human “active intellect theories” in stead (cf above, p 329,
(2)).
58 Instructive, e g, Kuhn’s research on the com plexity of (scientific 
discovery, c f e g, already h is "Historical Structure of Scientific 
D iscovery”, Science, 136, No 3518, June 1962, 760-764.
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